increased efforts at energy efficiency. The actions contrasted to the easy approvals previously given to utilities to build new power plants. In a similar vein, Congress passed a set of laws in 1978 that required energy firms to alter their behavior. One piece of legislation, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), encouraged increased overall energy efficiency by providing incentives to nonutility companies that produced power using cogeneration and renewable energy technologies. Inadvertently, the law also spurred efforts to deregulate the utility system because nonutility generators of power could often produce electricity at costs comparable to those offered by utilities; by doing so, the independent electricity producers appeared to challenge the rationale that legitimated natural monopoly status of regulated utilities.
Pursuing this logic further, the 1992 Energy Policy Act, advocated by President George H.W.
Bush after the first Iraqi War, enabled individual states to deregulate their electric power systems more fully, with the hope that free-market competition would enable innovation and make electricity production more efficient and less costly. As states began the deregulation process, with California being the first large state to pass a restructuring law in 1996 (to be implemented starting in 1998), it appeared that the existing utility consensus had dissipated, and momentum had clearly been altered.
Initial Exuberance Tempered by the California Electricity Crisis
Evidence of the changed momentum appeared in the form of state initiatives to deregulate their power systems. By October 2000, 23 states (and the District of Columbia) had passed laws that enabled customers to shop for power from traditional generators and from those that offered "green" power and energy-efficiency services. In New York, the Public Service Commission effectively created a competitive framework, and in all but five states, some form of The Golden State's initial experiences provided encouragement for the optimistic pursuit of restructuring. After a three-month delay caused by computer problems with the Independent System Operator (ISO) and the Power Exchange, institutions created by the restructuring legislation to manage an orderly wholesale market, California's $23 billion electricity business opened for competition on 31 March 1998. 11 More than two hundred independent companies registered to resell electricity to residential and business consumers, and a 10% rate reduction had already been implemented for customers of traditional utilities. 12 Nineteen participants (including the state's three major utilities) bid for electricity on the first day, with the average wholesale price settling just below $20 per megawatt-hour (MWh). That price compared to about $24 per MWh in the days before deregulation. For two years, retail competition appeared successful. Some businesses obtained favorable long-term contract prices for power, and residential consumers benefited from mandated rate reductions or discounts from new marketers. Many customers even chose to pay premium prices to alternative energy companies, such as Green Mountain Energy Resources, which offered electricity produced from wind and water turbines. 14 In other words, restructuring seemed to offer customers lower prices and new options, exactly as its advocates promised.
As part of the deregulation process, formerly monopolistic utilities needed to sell generation assets to independent companies. After all, how could competition work without competitors? With the money obtained from these asset sales, power companies paid off debts incurred from building some plants and from committing to long-term power contracts with nonutility companies that enjoyed favored status under PURPA. According to California's 1996
restructuring law, retail rates would remain frozen until these debts had been paid off, or at the end of March 2002, whichever came first. In an unexpected development, independent power companies bid up prices of several generating plants divested by southern California utilities.
Consequently, on July 1, 1999, San Diego Gas and Electric officially ended its rate freeze, and its customers became subject to a free market of power. For months, little changed, as electricity prices remained tame. 15 Then, in May 2000, prices began rising on the wholesale market, reaching more than 50 cents per kWh. To customers of Pacific Gas and Electric and Southern California Edison, still protected by the rate freeze, the higher wholesale prices had little practical impact. As the crisis evolved, state politicians tried to mitigate it. Governor Gray Davis, a
Democrat with reported presidential aspirations, at first sought to resolve the supply inadequacies without raising customers' rates. 24 But after several months, the governor, who inherited the restructuring plan from his Republican predecessor, intervened more forcefully.
Declaring a state of emergency on 17 January 2001, the governor authorized the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) to purchase power for utilities. The step appeared necessary, since nonutility power suppliers preferred not to sell directly to utilities, which had become bad credit risks. As another effort to guarantee enough power for the state's citizens , the state legislature encouraged the DWR to enter into long-term, stable contracts with electricity suppliers. To pay for these agreements, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) approved higher electricity rates-effectively ending the price freeze that was supposed to last another year. And to help stabilize the chaotic market, the legislature empowered the CPUC to 20 The company reorganized and exited bankruptcy in 35 Naturally, the cost of electricity rose as well.
As the importer of about 20% of its electricity, California also felt the impact of higher electricity prices elsewhere. In particular, the state bought power from Oregon and Washington, which generated power largely from hydroelectric dams. But these states encountered their own problems, resulting from lower-than-normal precipitation levels, leaving reservoirs depleted.
36
In these states, the cost of power started rising before Californian demand ratcheted up prices even more.
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The cap on consumers' prices further exacerbated problems. Part of the political compromise that won unanimous support in both houses of the California legislature, the cap provided price stability to residential consumers for several years as the state moved toward a competitive market. But by insulating customers from the fluctuating price of electricity in the wholesale market, the cap gave improper economic signals on how to use power. If electricity production became more expensive for whatever reason, the increased costs would not be passed on to consumers. Customers therefore did not know that they should pursue energy-efficiency measures, remaining happily blissful to the problems faced by the companies delivering electricity to them. Consequently, power demand kept increasing-though not heavily-at a time when supply had fallen dramatically. year. During the next month, peak demand sank to 14% below that of the previous June. For all of 2001, consumers shaved peak demand by almost 9% while cutting consumption by almost 7%. 39 Unhappily for supporters of deregulation and restructuring, who argued that competitive forces alone would work effectively, these dramatic improvements occurred due to forceful state intervention in a poorly functioning market.
Taking more pressure off the power market, the DWR signed long-term contracts with electricity generators, an approach not permitted under the original restructuring legislation.
Consequently, the number of short-term contracts traded on the wholesale market declined substantially. According to some analysts, the situation in which companies could remove power from the grid and manipulate the short-term market no longer existed, and the firms resumed production. With more power coming into the market and with less demand for it on the spot market, prices dropped. 40 By early 2002, wholesale prices had fallen to between $30
and $35 per MWh. In fact, the price dropped so much that the state sought to renegotiate $43 billion in long-term contracts that had locked in prices of about $70 per MWh-a price that seemed quite attractive when negotiated during the height of the crisis.
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The California experience soured many people on the value of deregulation. Instead of price reductions resulting from restructuring, the Golden State's businesses and residents saw price hikes. And rather than watching the free market encourage scores of competitors to offer new products and services, the state eliminated customer choice and empowered a government agency to buy power for utilities. Meanwhile, as news about market manipulation became public, observers and policy makers worried that malicious companies might exploit free markets in other states. 42 Some observers noted that the California experience should not necessarily discourage other entities from restructuring elsewhere, arguing that market reform California did (in December 1996), Pennsylvania did not require utilities to divest generating assets. Consequently, utilities could draw on power they produced rather than remain totally dependent on the wholesale market, in which prices could fluctuate wildly. Moreover, the legislation allowed utilities to arrange long-term contracts for wholesale power. They could therefore lock in prices for years ahead, hedging against high prices on the spot market. Just as important, Pennsylvania began competition in 1999 with a surplus of generation supply that enabled it to export power. Moreover, Pennsylvania's utilities participated in the PJM
Interconnection, a long-tested and reliable regional transmission organization that ties the state's grid to those of New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, and other states.
Partly because of these differences, the Keystone State's governor crowed about the success of competition at the same time that the California crisis brought national attention to restructuring. In an address in March 2001, Governor Tom Ridge observed that more than one million Pennsylvanians had shopped for power, with savings accruing to $3 billion.
Additionally, while Pennsylvania's electricity rates had stood 15% higher than the national consequences of electricity generation and consumption. Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, the president, the Congress, and most federal agencies also resisted efforts to create policy that directly addressed environmental concerns. This inaction occurred despite growing political pressure from within the United States and from other countries-especially those ratifying the Kyoto Protocol of 1997-to alleviate human-created (anthropogenic) climate change. 83 Decision makers in several states tried to fill the policy void by providing incentives for environmentally preferable generation technologies and energy-efficiency programs.
Specifically, by the end of 2006, 21 states (plus the District of Columbia) had created "renewable portfolio standards" that required power companies to produce (or to purchase) a certain amount of electricity coming from alternative resources over a set period. 84 Initially established as part of restructuring legislation in some states, the rules sought to encourage the use of biomass, greater than that of coal-burning power plants. 90 Beyond renewable portfolio standards, some states established "public benefit funds"
(also known as "system benefit funds"). Often created in tandem with legislation that restructured utility systems, these organizations receive funding from a surcharge on power bills regardless of whether a traditional utility or nonutility company provides customers with electricity. 91 In Oregon, a 1999 restructuring law created the Energy Trust, 92 which employs a three-percent surcharge to pay for energy conservation, renewable energy sources, and efficiency efforts. 93 In 2008 cents per kWh and 72 cents per therm of gas, according to the Trust.) Meanwhile, it developed about 33 MW (average) of renewable resource capacity. 94 These efforts, which the organization maintained also provided benefits in the form of new jobs and enhanced environmental quality, have made the Trust an exemplar among advocates of similar public benefit funds.
On the other side of the country, the "Efficiency Vermont" program focuses only on demand-side services. 95 Funded by a charge on every electric bill and operating under contract to the Vermont regulatory body since 2000, this "energy efficiency utility" took over the demand reduction services previously performed by almost all the state's utilities. 96 Employing contractors and partnerships with retailers, suppliers, and community-based service groups, the organization had a 2008 budget of about $31 million and claimed to have saved (in that year alone) 140,000 MWh at a cost of about 3 cents per kWh. 97 This cost compares favorably to the 14 cent per kWh price of utility-produced power. 98 While only 16 states have some form of public benefit funds, 99 the organizations that manage them have removed (at least partially) the planning function from traditional utility companies. By statute and practice, these new entities pursue renewable energy programs and energy-efficiency efforts, activities that utilities previously pursued, though often halfheartedly, 100 thus reducing the clout of managers who once designed and built generating facilities to meet growing needs.
New Technology Configurations
In pursuing their goals, FERC, states, and the public benefit fund organizations exploited continuously changing technologies on the supply-and demand-sides of the energy equation.
Other stakeholders used evolving hardware to suggest new permutations of the existing utility system or more radical changes to it. One such set of technologies consisted of cogeneration, renewable-energy, and gas-fired generation technologies-similar hardware that, when used by PURPA qualifying facilities in the 1980s, helped regulatory critics argue that utility companies
should not remain viewed as natural monopolies. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, these technologies became more popular when configured within a new conceptual and practical framework known as distributed generation. While users of DG technologies lose the benefits of scale economies, they gain compensating advantages. Most important for some users, they often obtain power at reliability levels that cannot be achieved by utility-supplied electricity. Because they do not depend on the utilities' transmission and distribution networks (which remain subject to failure), DG facilities can ensure consistent power supplies to manufacturing and service businesses that desperately need consistent, high-quality power. PURPA's requirements) to purchase power that customers do not need for themselves, in a process known as net metering: when customers produce more power than they consume, they sell electricity into the grid, causing their meters to run in reverse. 105 Californians, for example, and opportunities to consumers in "a humming, real-time, interactive energy marketplace," one that may not always involve traditional utility participants. 113 The key to achieving this promise lies in the automation of a multitude of devices attached to the grid, some of which add power to the network while others draw power from it. In one conceptualization of the smart grid, electrical appliances communicate with similar devices and to the grid itself, providing useful information from which consumers and power companies benefit. For example, "smart" water heaters, clothes dryers, and air conditioners could be turned off for a few minutes during system peak times (in an approach known as direct load control), thus enabling power companies to avoid generating expensive power or buying it from other suppliers. 114 The smart grid's potential has been demonstrated in pilot projects, and the Obama administration included several billion dollars for its implementation in "stimulus" funding legislation in 2009. 115 In one experiment run by Maryland's Constellation Energy, customers with smart-grid equipped homes learned continuously of their power consumption and received information on the price of electricity, which fluctuated during the day depending to the utility's production costs. The approach differs from one in which customers obtained information about use and pricing on their monthly bill, which arrived weeks after they consumed power, and it enabled people to reduce energy use by 22 to 37 percent. 116 In another test in which smart meters communicated between load-using equipment and utility company computers, Connecticut Light and Power customers reduced peak demand by 16 to23 percent. 117 The greater deployment of smart-grid enhanced appliances would augment these savings, say the technologies' advocates. In a prototype General Electric refrigerator, for example, energy savings and peak demand reductions occur when the device, which will supposedly cost only $10 more than its "dumb" counterpart, delays the defrost cycle and ice making functions until electricity prices decline. 118 In the largest test to date, Xcel Energy has begun installing smart meters and control devices in about 50,000 homes in Boulder, Colorado. 119 Though initiated with great fanfare in March 2008, the "SmartGridCity" 120 project has seen public support wane, as some of the program's costs have been passed on to consumers. 121 Similar projects elsewhere have encountered citizen opposition out of fear that smart grid implementation will increase prices. 122 Nevertheless, promoters hope to overcome early hiccups and realize the benefits of smart-grid implementation.
Besides opportunities to save energy and money, the smart grid offers consumers the chance to earn substantial income. As one example, consider the owners of hybrid gasolineelectric cars or fully electric vehicles whose batteries can be plugged in a wall outlet connected to the grid. Using equipment that links the car to the utility's network, the batteries could be programmed to charge during off-peak hours, thus increasing the power company's load factor.
Moreover, if drivers do not expect to use their cars during high-usage times (such as in the late afternoon on hot days), they can sell power to the grid, thus reducing a utility's need to start up peak-load equipment. Using net metering arrangements, customers who sell power (in a configuration often described as "vehicle-to-grid") would reduce their electric bills. 123 More enticing to some, the car batteries could provide ancillary services to the electric network-helping to regulate power quality in ways done traditionally by moderating the behavior of generation-plant equipment. Unlike the big fossil-fuel turbine-generators that maintain an almost constant frequency and voltage of alternating current, car batteries could provide the same services by near-instantaneous additions or reductions of power as dictated by smart control devices. 124 The principle has already been demonstrated using appliances that sense the frequency of alternating current in the grid and offer ancillary services when necessary. 125 In a pilot project performed by the PJM Interconnection and researchers at the services provided by the electric cars dwarfed the earnings derived from selling energy into the grid, even during peak-rate periods.
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These smart-grid and DG examples offer a vision of how consumers can reconfigure their relationship with utilities. Instead of remaining simple consumers of power, they can become producers of electricity and providers of regulation and ancillary services. In extreme circumstances, they could even dispense with their relationship with traditional utilities-or at least develop associations with other players. Some enthusiasts have already suggested that companies (known as aggregators) will combine the contributions of hundreds of smart-gridconnected homes and businesses to sell into the wholesale market managed by regional transmission operators such as PJM; they would only occasionally purchase power from the local utility when they cannot produce enough power themselves. FERC Chairman Wellinghoff thinks that companies such as Google and Microsoft, which have already entered the home power monitoring business, 128 would constitute natural aggregators due to their experience with consumers and the Internet. 129 Indeed, as the wholesale market becomes more amenable to both power generators and demand response, with smart-grid technologies seeing use in unusual ways, the involvement and sway of traditional utilities may diminish.
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Unlikelihood of New Consensus
With several stakeholders pursuing various agendas, a clear road toward a stable consensus along the lines that existed before 1970-or one that emerged in the late 1990s as restructuring gained adherents-appears elusive. Novel technologies, such as small-scale distributed generation facilities and smart electronics used for demand response, offer stakeholders fresh possibilities for changing the configuration of the utility system. At the same time, huge uncertainties remain within the political framework, especially relating to initiatives responding to the threat of climate change. These uncertainties make it difficult to predict whether large-scale, "carbon friendly" nuclear plants will be constructed, in which case traditional utility companies would perhaps re-acquire influence because they enjoy greater access to capital markets and government assistance. shareholder wealth. 134 Soon after, the failure of General Motors cost investors $91 billion; a taxpayer-funded bailout of billions more helped prevent the giant firm's demise and a tsunami effect throughout the broader economy. 135 At the same time, political pundits questioned government regulatory bodies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, which appeared either incompetent or incapable of overseeing industries that led the nation into desperate economic straits. 136 These recent events have dulled the extreme positions taken by advocates of both restructuring and regulation. On one hand, deregulation ideologues now rarely make claims of extravagant benefits that would automatically flow from more competitive markets. While policy makers may reject the legitimacy of natural monopoly status for electric utilities, once a significant rationale for regulation, they remain leery of the free market in the peculiar, wired realm of electricity; skepticism has increased especially as several states experienced electricity price hikes in their restructured environments. On the other hand, defenders of regulation remain chastened by frequent examples of poor government oversight. They may also be disheartened by situations in which renewed regulation brought little relief either, as was the case in Virginia, which ended its restructuring program in 2007 but suffered dramatically higher power prices nevertheless.
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In short, much has changed in the fifteen years since the establishment of a near consensus within the utility system based on free-market principles and less regulation. Rather than moving more vigorously toward retail competition and customer choice, many states have done the opposite-retreating from deregulation and reinstating forms of government oversight, though not always with optimal outcomes. The ideological fervor that stoked deregulation efforts, meanwhile, has faded as the experiments in competition highlighted business abuses and governments' inability to harness them effectively. At the same time, greatly empowered parties such as FERC, environmental advocates, and public benefit funds, continue to demonstrate the value of reducing demand and employing renewable energy facilities as cost-effective alternatives to construction of conventional generating capacity. And the use of novel technologies, such as distributed-generation devices that coordinate with smart-grid hardware to produce electricity or reduce its consumption, continues to alter relationships among stakeholders. As a result of this continuing flux within a complex social and technological system, it appears that no new utility consensus will emerge any time soon. 
